 Dalian Evening News coverage of China’s National Human Rights Action Plan (2012–2015) highlights publicizing cadre job vacancies, public complaint mechanisms, detainees’ rights, death penalty, and torture. |
China released its second National Human Rights Action Plan (NHRAP) in June covering the period from 2012–2015. Compared with China’s first plan spanning 2009–2010, the new NHRAP signals a cooling of human rights exchanges with the United Nations and Western countries, a shift towards cooperation with developing nations, and little movement on ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
UN, Organizational Relations Strained
China’s first NHRAP was issued during the last year of a three-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on technical cooperation between the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). China and the OHCHR signed their first MOU on technical cooperation in 2000, during a visit to Beijing by Mary Robinson, then High Commissioner for Human Rights. According to the MFA, successful cooperation led to the three-year MOU and an agreement to “carry out a range of cooperation programs in the areas of educating on human rights, enhancing capacity building and constructing a country governed by law.”
The 2009 NHRAP alludes to these MOUs by stating that “China continues technical cooperation” with the OHCHR, but this year’s plan replaces “technical cooperation” with “good cooperation.” The change reflects the expiry of the latest MOU and a lack of interest among both parties in renewal.
Although the MFA and OHCHR jointly held a seminar on the death penalty in December 2011—leading to an unrefuted estimate of the number of executions in China—senior Chinese diplomats have warned that future programs won’t take place until “finger pointing” and “confrontational attitudes” cease. Officials were alluding to statements issued by High Commissioner Navanethem Pillay and Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council since late 2011. Pillay condemned the sentencing of human rights defenders Liu Xianbin (刘贤斌), Chen Wei (陈卫), and Chen Xi (陈西); the revocation of Gao Zhisheng’s (高智晟) suspended sentence; and the disappearance of Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚)—when Chen was already in the US Embassy in Beijing—and wrote a letter to Tibetan hunger strikers camped outside UN headquarters in New York. The Special Procedures also issued statements highly critical of China’s human rights situation. For example, the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances stated that the “disappearance clauses” in China’s draft amended Criminal Procedure Law violate international law.
Although the Chinese government had previously indicated its willingness to host Pillay on a visit to China, by early 2012, enthusiasm waned. Chinese diplomats now indicate that an invitation will not be extended in the near future. Since the OHCHR was established in 1994, every high commissioner has made an official visit to China. In contrast, Pillay made official visits to all Perm Five and BRICS countries except China during her first term, and a visit to China is far from certain during her truncated second term. (China—along with other countries—refused to endorse the extension of Pillay’s mandate for four years and only agreed to an unprecedented two-year extension in May after strong lobbying by the South African government.)
 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay expresses deep concern over the sentencing of rights activist Chen Wei. Source: UN Photo |
Invitations for UN special rapporteurs (SR) also appear unlikely in the short term. In 2005, then SR on Torture Manfred Nowak conducted his mission to China, noting “widespread” torture and a “palpable level of fear.” Five years passed before China hosted its next, and seemingly less controversial, SR. The 2009 NHRAP states that China “considers inviting a special rapporteur,” and, in December 2010, SR on the Right to Food Olivier De Schutter conducted his mission. But while praising China for “lifting several hundred millions out of poverty,” De Schutter also mentioned Tibetan nomadic herders as a “vulnerable group” and recommended that China “suspend” their non-voluntary resettlement. Perhaps in light of the sensitive topics raised after the last two missions, China’s 2012 NHRAP does not specify how many SRs it will consider inviting, despite having about a dozen requests pending. Meanwhile, although the 2012 NHRAP does not alter China’s commitment to “answer letters” from Special Procedures, the information China provides is becoming more limited and polemical. China has also become more active in rejecting Special Procedures’ opinions on cases—such as the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’s opinion on the case of Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波)—and seeking to have them overturned.
The 2012 NHRAP omits mention of exchanges and cooperation with international organizations. While much of the language on international exchange found in the 2012 NHRAP is clearly modeled after that of the 2009 plan, for reasons unclear, the following was not carried over: “China continues to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Labor Organization and other relevant international organizations.”
Human Rights Dialogues
For human rights dialogues and exchanges, language in the 2012 plan strays from that of the 2009 NHRAP in two places. First, the word “bilateral” is removed as a descriptor for “dialogues and exchanges” that China continues to hold. Second, a sentence is added to include increased “consultation and cooperation with developing countries.” The 2012 NHRAP also adds mention of the Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights as an example of China’s continued participation in “the Asian-Pacific Region and Sub-region.”
Over the last two years, China has reduced the number of bilateral human rights dialogues and exchanges it holds with Western countries while decreasing the frequency and length of those conducted. China put an end to human rights talks with Norway—once considered among the best bilateral dialogues—because the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded Liu Xiaobo the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. China then cancelled the 2011 Sino-Australian dialogue apparently over Australia’s decision to host American marines at a base outside Darwin, and indefinitely terminated bilateral consultations with the Netherlands and Sweden. These decisions came after the Dutch foreign ministry awarded a human rights prize to Chinese lawyer and housing activist Ni Yulan (倪玉兰) and Sweden released a critical report on China’s human rights record.
The EU-China human rights dialogue has been reduced in frequency, at China’s insistence, from twice to once a year. As in other dialogues, China’s representatives resist accepting long lists of “cases of concern” and now give information on a relatively small number of the cases raised. Chinese representatives are also increasingly vocal in blasting the human rights records of their Western counterparts.
Selected Text from China’s National Human Rights Action Plans
Topic | 2009-2010 | 2012-2015 |
Dialogue | Continues to hold bilateral dialogues and exchanges on human rights with various countries concerned on the basis of equality and mutual respect | Continues to hold dialogues and exchanges on human rights with various countries on the basis of equality and mutual respect. China also increases consultation and cooperation on human rights with developing countries |
ICCPR | China … will continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval | China has continued to carry out administrative and judicial reforms and prepare the ground for approval |
International Exchange | China continues to participate in human rights activities in the framework of the Asian-Pacific Region and Sub-region. | Continues to participate in human rights activities in the framework of the Asian-Pacific Region and Sub-region, including the Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights |
International Organizations | Continues to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Labor Organization (ILO) and other relevant international organizations | [no parallel statement] |
Special Procedures | China continues its cooperation with the Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council, answers letters from it, and considers inviting a special rapporteur to visit China while taking into account the principle of balancing various human rights and China's reception abilities | China continues its cooperation with the Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council, answers letters from it, and considers inviting special reporters to visit China while taking into account the principle of balancing various human rights and China's reception abilities |
UN OHCHR | Continues technical cooperation | Continues its good cooperation |
Note: All bold text has been added for the purpose of comparison. | ||
Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese government, sometimes through the China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS), has discussed human rights with developing countries and former Eastern bloc countries. (Beijing has had a human rights dialogue with Hungary for more than 10 years, although little is known about the dialogue and issues discussed therein.) There was an uptick in Chinese human rights diplomacy with developing countries in 2012, with June visits by the CSHRS to Belarus—a country ostracized by the West for its poor human rights record—and by Premier Wen Jiabao to Chile—where the two sides agreed to “informal consultations and contacts on issues of human rights and the judiciary.”
China’s dissatisfaction with human rights exchanges with Western countries and the United Nations has been building most notably since the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, but internal factors appear to play an important role in the ongoing chill. A once-in-a-decade leadership change has begun, and China is struggling to present a smooth transition and downplay human rights abuses. Moreover, Vice President Xi Jinping, expected to be named secretary general of the Communist Party at the 18th Party Congress later this year, is no fan of China’s foreign critics. In 2009, he derided them as “foreigners, with full bellies, who have nothing better to do than to try to point fingers.” The 2012 NHRAP indicates that it may be some time, if ever, before China returns to the days when human rights exchanges with the UN and the West were an important feature of the country’s foreign policy.
ICCPR
Despite being a key goal of Chinese reformers and the international human rights community, ratification of the ICCPR is not a priority for the Chinese government. China signed the ICCPR in 1997 and is still committed to eventual ratification, but as a Chinese official told Dui Hua in March 2012: “There is no timetable for ratification.” (Until recently, Chinese diplomats confidently predicted that China would be quicker to ratify the ICCPR than the United States, suggesting that China would ratify before June 8, 2013.)
The ICCPR comes last on the list of international covenants mentioned in the 2012 action plan, which states: “China has continued to carry out administrative and judicial reforms and prepare the ground for approval.” This removes the legislative reference found in the 2009 NHRAP, which states that China “will make domestic laws better linked with the Covenant.”
As written into its earlier action plan, China has taken some steps to align its domestic laws with the ICCPR, like increasing due process rights for the majority of criminal defendants and sharply reducing the number of executions. But in some areas—like reform or abolition of the system of reeducation through labor—no progress has been made, while in others—such as the codification of the “disappearance clauses”—China has moved backwards.
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