Justice for Some, Notoriety for Others: Public Law Enforcement in China

Ten thousand people watched this public sentencing and arrest gathering in Xinjiang's Tekesi [Tekes] County, Yili [Ili] Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture on June 16, 2014. Image credit: Tekesi County People's Court

Part of doing justice in the criminal process is protecting the dignity of people in custody, presuming their innocence, and providing them with the conditions necessary for fair trial. China’s decisions to prohibit public executions, in 1979, and ban “perp walks” for sex workers, in 2010, seemed to acknowledge at least some of these principles, but ongoing public arrests and sentencing and televised confessions indicate that dignity and fairness are not afforded equally to all Chinese citizens.

Public arrests and sentencing are often held in large outdoor public spaces like plazas and stadiums and feature the accused bound and flanked by police—at times with placards around their necks—in front of crowds of spectators that can number in the thousands. According to Phoenix Weekly, at least 196 “public displays of law enforcement” (i.e., public arrests and sentencing) were reported on by Chinese news media between 2008 and May 2011. More than 90 percent of the gatherings were in smaller cities, i.e., county-level cities and municipally administered districts. The report says that the gatherings aim to “frighten criminals, educate people, and maintain social stability.”

Historically, public arrest and sentencing rallies were widely used in and outside China to crush political opponents and consolidate the power of royal families. In the first three decades of the People’s Republic of China, mass rallies served to educate the public about the errors of class enemies, including Kuomintang members and landlords.

Legal experts have spoken out against modern-day public arrests and sentencing, branding them “campaign-style justice” that emphasizes swift and severe punishment. In July 2010, Renmin University of China Law Professor Guo Weidong told Legal Daily that gatherings like these violate the presumption of innocence that requires the court to prove the guilt of a criminal defendant. Several legal experts joined the call for a legislative ban of these public rallies after more than 20,000 spectators witnessed the arrest of about 70 criminal suspects who were paraded in a public plaza in Qidong County, Hunan Province, on April 12, 2011. The rally was held amid a local “strike hard” campaign that began earlier that year.

Xinjiang and Tibet

Critics have been less vocal, however, about public arrest gatherings in Xinjiang. There public rallies are often publicized as stern efforts to combat and educate the public about the “three evil forces” of “separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism,” giving them a veneer of legitimacy amid the global “war on terror.” China News Website has called such gatherings “a concrete action to crack down on violent terrorist crimes and to rejuvenate positive energy in society.”

In May, 7,000 people witnessed the detention, arrest, and sentencing of more than 100 Uyghurs charged with inciting splittism, terrorism, and murder in a stadium in Yili [Ili] Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture. Pictures of the event were widely circulated in official news media.

That said, public rallies in Xinjiang occur even without allegations of extremism. As recently as June 16, 2014, 15 suspects shackled on blue trucks were condemned in front of 10,000 people in Tekesi [Tekes] County, Yili. They were charged with cult offenses, disrupting official business, and rape.

In contrast with Xinjiang, Tibet has received little media attention for public arrests and sentencing. The most recent instance of such an event being reported in official media was on March 9, 2012, in Jiulong [Gyezur] County. No information was made public on the allegations against the suspects and defendants but a crowd of more than 5,000 spectators, including cadres and students, watched as 24 people were detained, arrested, and tried.

In December 2011, Tibetan writer Woeser posted six photos of Tibetan monks captured by armed police during a stability maintenance campaign in Ganzi [Kardze] and Aba [Ngaba] prefectures. The images of people bound and bedecked with placards—some in open trucks beds—were reminiscent of those subjected to public arrests and sentencing but no narrative came with the photos. Some of the placards displayed criminal charges such as splittism and gathering a crowd to attack an organ of the state. Woeser speculated that the photos were taken sometime between March 2008 and 2011.

TV Set Confessional

Public arrests and sentencing if concentrated in Xinjiang appear to exist throughout the country and in response to various anti-crime campaigns. Probably due to the nature of their transmission, televised confessions seem to be more commonly applied to celebrities and public figures who have infringed upon the economic and political interests of the party.

The most recent televised confessions were made by Jaycee Chan, son of Hong Kong action film star Jackie Chan, and Taiwanese actor Kai Ko. (Ko’s detention was reportedly publicized before his family was notified, breaking with a cross straits agreement requiring notification within 24 hours.) Both were detained on drug charges in Beijing on August 14. Their confessions were preceded in early August by that of Internet celebrity Guo Meimei, who has been charged with illegal gambling.

Confessions on TV: (top left, clockwise) Kai Ko, Guo Meimei, Peter Humphrey, and Gao Yu. Image credit: CCTV

Foreign nationals have also been compelled to make televised confessions. In August 2013, Briton Peter Humphrey apologized to the Chinese government on Chinese Central Television for illegally obtaining private information. Broadcast narration from the news segment describes China as a country ruled by law where police fight crime regardless of whether it is committed by Chinese nationals or foreigners. Humphrey’s firm conducted investigations for GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in China; the global drug company is now facing corruption allegations.

Chinese journalists have also been targeted. Chen Yongzhou (陈永州) was detained in July 2013 on suspicion of damaging business reputation after writing several newspaper articles accusing a listed company of falsifying its sales. Chen’s detention initially triggered a strong backlash in official Chinese media with several critics calling for his immediate release. The tide turned after the Central Publicity Department intervened in the case, and in late October 2013, state television aired Chen’s confession as filmed from a detention center in Changsha, Hunan Province.

In the lead up to the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Protest, another journalist, Gao Yu (高瑜), became the subject of televised confession . Gao’s face was blurred as she pled guilty to “illegally procuring state secrets for foreign entities” on May 30, 2014, the day of her formal arrest. Gao was accused of circulating Document No. 9 to an overseas website. The apparently classified document lists “seven perils” threatening the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including western constitutional democracy, media independence, and civic participation. Gao was previously sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for illegally procuring state secrets in November 1994 for criticizing the violent suppression of the 1989 pro-democracy protests.

Both forms of public shaming, televised confessions and public arrests and sentencing likely share the same goals: frightening criminals, educating people, and maintaining social stability. Absent from this list of aims is justice, procedural or substantive. Public law enforcement marginalizes lawyers and courtrooms and with them go dignity, presumptions of innocence, and the likelihood of a fair trial. With an emphasis on legal reform in the upcoming plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in October, perhaps one area worth revisiting is the tendency for humiliation to masquerade as justice.

Zhonggong: The Subversive Business of Qigong

Qigong practitioners "receiving energy (qi)" from a qigong master. During the 1980s and 90s, gatherings like this were popular in China. Image credit: Netease News

Qigong—involving mediation, breathing, and movement—is meant to heal, but according to Chinese authorities, it can also harm. The central government has banned 14 “harmful” qigong organizations not including the popularly known Falun Gong, which was outlawed as a “cult.”[1] Though distinctly branded, at least one lesser known qigong organization, Zhonggong, has experienced government suppression similar to that of Falun Gong.

China’s qigong craze lasted from around 1978 to 1999. Qigong was popularized by the Communist Party as “somatic science” under the banner of the “Four Modernizations,” which included national defense, agriculture, industry, and science and technology. During the 1980s, the homegrown healing practice instilled confidence in Chinese ingenuity at a time when the country was still reeling from decades of internal upheaval.

Zhonggong, also known as China Healthcare and Wisdom Enhancement Practice (中华养生智能功), was established by Zhang Hongbao (张宏堡) in 1987. Zhang gained popularity by publicly demonstrating his mystical healing powers, and at its peak, Zhonggong claimed to have 38 million members and 100,000 employees nationwide. Some scholars believe that, until about 1995, Zhonggong was more popular in China than Falun Gong.

However, with qigong popularity, came high-level opposition. In April 1999, state-run media ran an article entitled “I Don’t Support Youth Practicing Qigong,” calling Falun Gong “superstitious” and “harmful.” In response, 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners surrounded Zhongnanhai and demanded an apology. Unwilling to make concessions to a group that threatened party loyalty through mass mobilization, the central government outlawed Falun Gong as a cult in July 1999. Zhonggong was branded a harmful qigong organization later that year and banned for defying leaders; spreading superstition; and engaging in criminal acts such as pyramid schemes, rapes, and murders.

Shortly after the ban, Zhang Hongbao fled to Guam. China filed a request for his extradition, but the United States declined in accordance with the UN Convention Against Torture. Receiving protective resident status in 2001, Zhang faced a series of civil lawsuits and felony charges in the United States between 2003 and 2005. Some accusations, such as domestic violence, were related to his personal life, while others related to Zhonggong. By the time Zhang died in a car accident in July 2006, however, most of these cases had been withdrawn.

With the exception of Zhang Hongbao, individual Zhonggong leaders have garnered little international attention. They are generally not viewed as victims of religious or political persecution. This is due in part to the fact that Zhonggong has historically been more commercial than Falun Gong, making it seem at times more akin to a business marketed on its health benefits than a spiritual organization. (Zhonggong members are more or less required to purchase practice sessions and publications to increase their group rank.) It is also important to note that, perhaps influenced by religious persecution during the Mao period and the celebration of somatic science that continued into the 1990s, many qigong practitioners, including Zhonggong adherents, do not identify as religious followers. Still, the focus on qigong’s “extraordinary powers” has led some western scholars to recognize Zhonggong as part of the “new religious movement”—the emergence in China of a number of non-mainstream religious sects after reform and opening began in 1978.

While official Chinese media often claim that Zhonggong was banned to protect people from social harms (e.g., defiance, superstition, and criminal activity), the crackdown on the group, if not religious, is at least partly political. According to data in Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database, Zhonggong leaders are more likely than Falun Gong leaders to be convicted of endangering state security (ESS) crimes. The database includes information on two dozen Zhonggong leaders detained or sentenced since 1999.

1999-2002: Early Suppression

Within the first two years of its banning, Zhonggong saw 600 leaders detained nationwide, according to overseas media reports. Nearly a dozen were sentenced for inciting subversion, an ESS offense. ESS charges stemmed from the distribution of two critical letters about Jiang Zemin, then Chinese president, to thousands of police stations. Written pseudonymously by two people who claimed to be police officers, the letters stated that Jiang’s crackdown on Zhonggong resembled Mao Zedong’s lawlessness during the “Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns” and the Cultural Revolution. Police who received the letter were urged to defy Jiang’s order to arrest Zhonggong practitioners. As a result of the letter campaign, 11 Zhonggong leaders from Henan, Jiangsu, and Qinghai provinces were convicted of inciting subversion and sentenced to 1‒4 years in prison or reeducation through labor (RTL) between 2000 and 2001.

Perhaps due to the fact that they caused less of a stir, Zhonggong leaders received shorter sentences than Falun Gong leaders in the first years after they were banned. The lengthiest sentence Dui Hua has recorded for a Zhonggong leader during this period is seven years’ imprisonment, handed down to Zhou Xinyang (周新扬) for tax evasion in Hunan. Several other leaders in Hubei, Chongqing, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Zhejiang were sentenced to 1‒3 years in prison or RTL for disturbing social order or illegal medical practice. A number of Falun Gong leaders who participated in the Zhongnanhai protests were sentenced to more than 10 years in prison on cult charges.

In Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, sociologist David Palmer argues that unlike Falun Gong, Zhonggong declined swiftly in the face of repression because its leaders were primarily motivated by money. Public security records in Sichuan also suggest that many Zhonggong members stopped holding practice sessions immediately after 1999.

Some official records indicate, however, that Zhonggong’s influence remained. Dozens to hundreds of active practitioners continued to be found in counties in Anhui, Hebei, Henan, Shaanxi, and Xinjiang. Local governments launched a series of crackdowns on Zhonggong revivals known as the “first reorganization.” For example, in 2000, Sun Haixin (孙海欣) and Hu Wanping (胡皖平) were detained in Anhui for possessing more than 100 tons of Zhonggong books and audiovisual materials and “illegally raised funds” exceeding 4.7 million yuan. In 2002, Hu Suyan (胡素艳) and Ji Sujuan (纪淑娟) were said to have sold dozens of Zhonggong publications and antiseptic products in Gaocheng City, Anhui. Official sources do not mention whether these individuals were convicted of any crimes.

Sentenced Zhonggong Leaders by Crime, 1999‒2001

Name	Location	Sentence	Facility
Inciting Subversion
Huang Wanping 黄万平	Jiangsu	4 years	Prison
Qin Zhaoyang 秦朝阳	Jiangsu	3 years	Prison
Zhai Xuehai 翟学海	Jiangsu	3 years	Prison
Dong Jielan 董佳兰	Jiangsu	2 years	Prison
Ju De 居德	Henan	2.5 years	Prison
Ye Yaonian 叶耀年	Henan	2.5 years	Prison
Rui Guojie 芮国杰	Qinghai	1 year	RTL
Zhao Zegen 赵泽根	Qinghai	1 year	RTL
Yang Weihu 杨卫虎	Qinghai	1 year	RTL
Xiang Renbo 项仁波	Qinghai	1 year	RTL
Chai Jinchun 柴景春	Qinghai	1 year	RTL
Disturbing Social Order
Cheng Yaqin 程亚琴	Hebei	2 years	RTL
Xi Dafang 席大芳	Guangxi	1 year	RTL
Illegal Medical Practice
Chen Jinlong 陈金龙	Zhejiang	2 years	Prison
Tax Evasion
Zhou Xinyang 周新扬	Hunan	7 years	Prison
Unknown
Li Xiaoning 李晓宁	Chongqing	3 years	Prison
Wang Xuemei 王雪梅	Guangdong	2 years	Prison
Yan Xiehe 严协和	Guangxi	3 years	Prison

Mid-2000s: “Second Activation”

Zhonggong Founder Zhang Hongbao. Source: rbw.org.cn

Around the mid-2000s, the term “second activation” began to appear in government sources to describe Zhonggong’s second revival, and local government records began labelling Zhonggong activities as “anti-China.” This development followed an increase in Zhang Hongbao’s political activism overseas. After taking up residence in the United States, Zhang claimed to have raised $2.7 million for China’s democracy movement. In 2003, he founded Zhonggong’s US headquarters and declared himself president of “China Shadow Government,” an opposition group in exile which advocated for political reform.

Official yearbooks condemned activities involved in the second activation. In 2005, 20 “reactionary” slogans—“Let’s unite, reclaim our Zhonggong bases, and learn from the Falun Gong spirit”—were discovered in Baoji, Shaanxi. In 2006, Zhonggong leaders reportedly aligned with overseas hostile forces to establish an underground opposition party in Wushan County, Chongqing. That same year, four months after his death, Zhang was labeled by Tianjin’s Anti-cult Association—a non-profit, voluntary group whose members often have government backgrounds—as a traitor who used funding from hostile western forces to divide China.

During this period, Zhonggong leaders faced harsher punishments than those reported from 1999 to 2001. Li Zhanling (李占领) was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for inciting subversion in 2004. According to his defense lawyers, Li was appointed a leader during Zhonggong’s first and second reorganizations. He was in charge of organizing practice sessions and training leaders in Cangzhou, Hebei Province.

In a separate case, an online verdict indicated that seven leaders detained in 2006 in Donggang City, Liaoning, were sentenced to 6‒15 years’ imprisonment in September 2008. Although Zhonggong is not officially classified as a cult, it is often targeted in anti-cult propaganda, and one of the defendants in the Donggang case, Gong Shaohong (宫绍洪), was convicted on cult charges. (The other six leaders in this case were sentenced for illegal business activities.)

Prosecutors accused Gong of compiling and editing three banned books that “rejected atheism,” widely cited Zhang Hongbao’s theories, and “spread apocalyptical rumors.” Over 6,000 copies of these books were sold as teaching materials in 10 provinces, and the sales of all publications (including but not limited to the book) generated revenues exceeding 7 million yuan. Confessing to tax evasion and illegal business activity, Gong insisted that he was not involved in any cult activity. Nonetheless, he was convicted on all three charges and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, the longest known sentence for a Zhonggong leader.

After their release in 2011, some individuals involved in the Donggang case published online posts claiming that they were victims of forced confession. They said the charges were fabricated by a state security officer who confiscated and embezzled their book sale revenues. While admitting to practicing Zhonggong in the past, they claimed to have relinquished it soon after the national ban. They also stated in Gong Shaohong’s defense that his books aimed to cultivate love for the party and the nation.

Sentenced Zhonggong Leaders by Crime, 2004‒2008

Name	Prison Sentence	Release Date
Inciting Subversion
Li Zhanling 李占领	10 years	2014
Organizing a cult to undermine implementation of the law
Gong Shaohong 宫绍洪 †	15 years	Apr 5, 2021
Illegal business activity
Wang Shujuan 王淑娟	6 years	Nov 30, 2011
Yu Yongxiang 于永香	6 years	Nov 30, 2011
Yu Yongfang 于永芳 ‡	8 years	Nov 25, 2014
Xi Yong 刁勇	5 years	Nov 25, 2011
Gong Shaoying 宫绍英	5 years	Nov 25, 2011
Guo Zhenfeng 郭振凤	Suspended	--

† Gong Shaohong was also convicted of illegal business activity and tax evasion.
‡ Yu Yongfang was also convicted of tax evasion.

Post-2006: Lingering Influence

Internal frictions arising from Zhang Hongbao’s death in 2006 are believed to have further weakened Zhonggong’s influence in China, but Zhonggong groups continue to operate. Local government records still mention crackdowns on Zhonggong alongside suppression of Falun Gong and banned Christian groups such as Almighty God.

For example, in May 2010, two Zhonggong leaders from Hebei and Sichuan provinces were given admonitions for inviting nearly 500 practitioners from more than 10 provinces to join a secret gathering to celebrate the birthday of another Zhonggong master. A sentence for attempting “to illegally amass vast fortunes” was handed down to the man whose birthday was to be celebrated at a Buddhist temple in Wuxue City, Hubei.

In January 2011, Ningxia’s government website expounded upon the “reactionary” nature of Zhonggong. It proclaimed that Zhonggong founder Zhang Hongbao had a hidden agenda to turn qigong classes into another Whampoa Military Academy. (The academy produced a number of prominent mainland Chinese revolutionary leaders from its founding in 1924 until it was relocated to Taiwan in 1950.) The article also stated that Zhang urged his followers to be independent of the party’s control and to listen to Zhonggong’s US headquarters. It said some members deemed Zhonggong’s ideology as the only cure to widespread corruption in China. In 2012, multiple townships in Hebei, Hunan, Shanxi, and Sichuan provinces released anti-Zhonggong directives on their government websites.

The most recently published Zhonggong case involved ESS charges. In 2013, the Hubei High People’s Court sentenced a Zhonggong leader surnamed Wang to three years’ imprisonment for inciting subversion. The court found that Wang had organized two Zhonggong training courses for nearly 40 practitioners in Zhangjiajie and Xiangtan, Hunan. Participants paid 1,200 yuan for each of the courses during which Wang made “slanderous” remarks about the party. (He described it as a “demon” and a corrupt regime that murdered many people during the Cultural Revolution). Witnesses confirmed that Wang gave lectures on how the party persecuted Zhonggong and Zhang Hongbao. In addition to circulating the Nine Commentaries, a banned Falun Gong publication, Wang was also said to have distributed Charter 08, the political manifesto that largely led to the imprisonment of Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), and materials about June Fourth. At his home, Wang was found to have saved 21 copies of Falun Gong documents on multiple electronic devices.

Zhonggong is officially “harmful,” but the grounds for its stigmatization are not entirely clear. Is the group too religious or superstitious? Is it violent or fraudulent? Or is it merely defiant? Official media have set the tone by reporting on sensational Zhonggong cases and individuals but could it be, as public records show, that the problem with Zhonggong is not that it is harmful, but that it is political?  

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[1] The Chinese names of the “14 harmful qigong groups” are: 1. 中华养生益智功（简称中功）2. 香功 3. 菩提功 4.元极功 5. 华藏功 6. 中华昆仑女神功 7. 人宇特能功 8. 三三九乘元功 9. 日月气功 10. 万法归一功 11. 慈悲功 12. 沈昌人体科技 13. 一通健康法 14. 中国自然特异功。(Source: Meishan Daily)    ↑ top

Gao Zhisheng Begins Sentence of Deprivation of Political Rights

Gao Zhisheng was released from Xijiang's Shaya Prison on August 7, 2014. Image credit: rfa.org

Gao Zhisheng (高智晟), a defense lawyer known for taking on politically sensitive cases and for calling on the Chinese government to end its persecution of Falun Gong, completed his three-year prison sentence for inciting subversion today. He was released from Shaya Prison in western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Gao was accompanied by his brother and taken by police escort to his father-in-law’s house in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital and Gao’s place of household registration (hukou).

Gao now begins his supplemental sentence of one year of deprivation of political rights (DPR). China’s Criminal Law, promulgated in March 1997, stipulates that DPR sentences of 1‒5 years be applied to individuals convicted of inciting subversion (which falls under the category of endangering state security) and other serious crimes. According to Chapter 3, Section 7 of the Criminal Law, people serving DPR sentences lose their rights to freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration.

Two years prior to the promulgation of the Criminal Law, the Ministry of Public Security issued the “Regulations for Monitoring and Management of Offenders Subject to Public Surveillance, Deprivation of Political Rights, Suspended Sentence, Parole, or Medical Parole by Public Security Organs.” The Dui Hua Foundation has translated these regulations in their entirety. Together with the relevant articles of the Criminal Law, these regulations provide the framework for how Gao Zhisheng will be monitored and managed over the next 12 months.

According to the regulations, public security authorities in Urumqi (Gao’s place of residence) will be responsible for monitoring and observing him during DPR. He must report periodically to police and receive their approval to travel outside Urumqi. The regulations prohibit Gao from giving interviews to journalists, and from “publishing or circulating, inside or outside China, any remarks, books, audio recordings, or other such items that damage the reputation or interests of the state or pose any other threat to society.”

Gao was detained on suspicion of inciting subversion on August 16, 2006, and sentenced on December 22, 2006, to three years in prison and one year deprivation of political rights by the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court. The prison sentence was suspended for five years, but shortly before that period ended, the suspension was revoked by the court on December 16, 2011. Gao was then incarcerated in remote Shaya Prison. The four months and seven days he spent in detention prior to his first trial was credited to his three-year sentence.

Local public security bureaus have a high degree of discretion to establish measures targeting specific individuals during the enforcement of DPR. Given what is known about how Gao was treated during the period of his suspended sentence, portions of which were spent in Urumqi, and the current tense situation in Xinjiang arising from ethnic strife between Uyghurs and Han, it is likely that the Urumqi public security authorities will strictly implement the regulations, thereby effectively restricting Gao’s personal freedom and contact with the outside world.

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Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China

Order 23

These “Regulations for Monitoring and Management of Offenders Subject to Public Surveillance, Deprivation of Political Rights, Suspended Sentences, Parole, or Medical Parole by Public Security Organs” have been passed by the Ministerial Conference of the Ministry of Public Security and are hereby issued for implementation.

Minister of Public Security Tao Siju
February 21, 1995

Regulations for Monitoring and Management of Offenders Subject to Public Surveillance, Deprivation of Political Rights, Suspended Sentences, Parole, or Medical Parole by Public Security Organs

Section I. General Provisions

Article 1: In order to safeguard the smooth operation of the criminal process and the strict enforcement of criminal verdicts and rulings, as well as to strengthen monitoring and management of offenders subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole, these regulations are hereby enacted in accordance with the Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law, and the Regulations on Public Order Management Penalties.

Article 2: County (city) public security bureaus and urban public security bureau branches shall take responsibility for arranging and implementing the monitoring and management of offenders subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole.

Article 3: When public security organs carry out monitoring and management of offenders subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole, they must put in effect a monitoring and management responsibility system and carry out management in accordance with the law and in a civilized manner.

Article 4: After the public security organ receives a verdict, ruling, or decision from a people’s court ordering that an offender be subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole or receives a decision from the prison administration authority approving medical parole, the public security organ shall immediately form a monitoring and observation team, set up a monitoring and observation file, and formulate and implement specific measures for monitoring and observation.

Article 5: When an offender subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole relocates his or her residence with the permission of the public security organ, the public security organ originally responsible for enforcement shall provide the public security organ responsible for enforcement in the new location with an introduction to the offender’s situation and transfer all monitoring and observation files.

Article 6: Public security organs shall provide timely reports of their monitoring and management of offenders subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole to people’s procuratorates, people’s courts, and prison administration authorities.

Article 7: Monitoring and management of offenders subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole by the public security organs is subject to oversight by people’s procuratorates.

Section II. Monitoring and Management of Offenders Subject to Public Surveillance or Deprivation of Political Rights

Article 8: With respect to offenders who have been sentenced to public surveillance or deprivation of political rights, the county (city) public security bureau or urban public security bureau branch shall assign the public security police station in the offender’s place of residence to take specific responsibility for monitoring and observation. The urban residents committee or village committee in the offender’s place of residence or his or her former work unit shall assist in carrying out monitoring activity.

Article 9: Public security organs responsible for monitoring and observation of offenders subject to public surveillance or deprivation of political rights shall, according to the verdict of the people’s court, make an announcement to the offender and members of the public from his or her former work unit or place of residence, including the facts of the offender’s crime, the duration of his or her public surveillance or deprivation of political rights, and the rules that the offender must obey during the enforcement period.

Article 10: The public security organ shall announce to an offender sentenced to public surveillance that he or she must obey the following rules during the enforcement period:

(1) Obey state laws and regulations as well as any relevant provisions enacted by the Ministry of Public Security;

(2) Actively engage in productive labor or other work;

(3) Periodically report his or her activities and situation to the monitoring and observation team;

(4)Obtain permission from the public security organ before moving to a new residence or leaving his or her area of residence;

(5) Obey all specific measures for monitoring and management established by the public security organ.

Article 11: When an offender subject to public surveillance needs to leave his or her area of residence, he or she must receive approval from the public security organ and obtain an exit certificate. Upon arrival at and departure from his or her destination, the offender must report to the local public security police station, which shall make note of the arrival and departure times and the offender’s behavior on the exit certificate. Upon return to the enforcement locale, the offender must immediately report to the public security organ and hand over the certificate.

Article 12: The public security organ shall declare to an offender sentenced to deprivation of political rights that he or she must obey the following rules during the enforcement period:

(1) Obey state laws and regulations as well as any relevant provisions enacted by the Ministry of Public Security;

(2) He or she may not vote or stand for election;

(3) He or she may not organize or participate in any assembly, march, demonstration, or association;

(4) He or she may not give interviews or make speeches;

(5) He or she may not publish or circulate, inside or outside China, any remarks, books, audiovisual recordings, or other such items that damage the reputation or interests of the state or pose any other threat to society;

(6) He or she may not take up any position in the state civil service;

(7) He or she may not take up a leadership position in any enterprise, state institution, or mass organization;

(8) Obey all specific measures for monitoring and management established by the public security organ.

Article 13: Any offender subject to public surveillance or deprivation of political rights who violates these provisions shall, when the violation does not constitute a criminal offense, be subject to public-order management penalty by the public security organ in accordance with the law. When the violation constitutes a criminal offense, criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance with the law.

Article 14: At the conclusion of the period of public surveillance or deprivation of political rights, the public security organ shall notify the individual (serving the sentence) and make a public announcement of release from public surveillance or restoration of political rights.

When an offender dies during the period of public surveillance or deprivation of political rights, the public security organ shall immediately make a report to the sentencing people’s court or the prison that held former custody.

Upon release from public surveillance, a “Notice of Release from Public Surveillance” shall be issued. When deprivation of political rights has been imposed as a supplementary punishment, a simultaneous announcement of restoration of political rights shall be made.

Section III. Monitoring and Management of Offenders Granted Suspended Sentences or Parole

Article 15: With respect to offenders who have been granted suspended sentences or parole, during the probationary period of the suspension or parole the county (city) public security bureau or urban public security bureau branch shall assign the public security police station in the offender’s place of residence to carry out monitoring and observation. The urban residents committee or village committee in the offender’s place of residence or his or her former work unit shall assist in carrying out monitoring activity.

Article 16: Public security organs responsible for monitoring and observation of offenders granted suspended sentences or parole shall, according to the verdict or decision of the people’s court, make an announcement to and members of the public from the offender’s former work unit or place of residence, including the facts of the offender’s crime, the duration of his or her probationary period, and the rules that the offender must obey during the probationary period.

Article 17: The public security organ shall announce to an offender who has been granted a suspended sentence or parole that he or she must obey the following rules:

(1) Obey state laws and regulations as well as any relevant provisions enacted by the Ministry of Public Security;

(2) Periodically report his or her activities and situation to the enforcement organ;

(3) Obtain permission from the public security organ before moving to a new residence or leaving his or her area of residence;

(4) If the offender serving a suspended sentence or parole has been given the supplementary punishment of deprivation of political rights, he or she must obey the rules set out in Article 12 of these regulations;

(5) Obey all specific measures for monitoring and management established by the public security organ.

Article 18: For offenders granted suspended sentences or parole, the public security organ shall periodically request reports on the offender’s behavior and situation from his or her former work unit or from the urban residents committee or village committee in his or her place of residence, and the public security unit shall also establish an observation file.

Article 19: When an offender granted parole violates these provisions during the probationary period, if the violation does not constitute a new criminal offense requiring remand to prison, the public security organ shall recommend to the people’s court that the parole be revoked. When the people’s court rules to revoke parole, the public security organ shall immediately return the offender to prison to serve his or her sentence.

Article 20: Any offender granted a suspended sentence or parole who violates these provisions shall, when the violation does not constitute a criminal offense, be subject to public-order management penalty by the public security organ in accordance with the law. When the violation constitutes a criminal offense, the public security organ shall report to the people’s court requesting revocation of the suspended sentence or parole and pursue criminal liability in accordance with the law.

Article 21: At the end of the probationary period of a suspended sentence, if the offender granted a suspended sentence has not committed any new crime during the probationary period, the original penalty shall not be enforced and the public security organ shall declare [the end of the sentence] to the individual and make a report to the sentencing people’s court.

At the end of the probationary period for parole, if the offender granted parole has not committed any new crime during the probationary period, his or her sentence shall be considered complete and the public security organ shall declare [the end of the sentence] to the individual and make a report to the people’s court that granted parole and the offender’s former prison.

When an offender dies while serving a suspended sentence or parole, the public security organ shall immediately make a report to the sentencing people’s court and the [offender’s] former prison.

Section IV. Monitoring and Management of Offenders Released on Medical Parole

Article 22: With respect to offenders who have been released on medical parole, the county (city) public security bureau or urban public security bureau branch shall assign the public security police station in the offender’s place of residence or place of medical treatment to take responsibility for monitoring. The urban residents committee or village committee or the offender’s former work unit shall assist in carrying out monitoring activity. When necessary, the public security organ may assign personnel to keep close watch.

Article 23: The public security organ shall make a declaration to the offender released on medical parole and members of the public from his or her former work unit or place of residence, including the facts of the offender’s crime, the reason for release on medical parole, and the rules that the offender must obey while under medical parole.

Article 24: The public security organ shall declare to an offender who has been released on medical parole that he or she must obey the following rules during the parole period:

(1) Obey state laws and regulations as well as any relevant provisions enacted by the Ministry of Public Security;

(2) Receive medical treatment at the assigned hospital;

(3) When, due to the special needs of medical treatment or care, it is necessary to change hospitals or leave the area of residence, approval must first be obtained from the public security organ;

(4) Any social activities other than medical treatment must receive approval from the public security organ;

(5) Obey all specific measures for monitoring and management established by the public security organ.

Article 25: When the public security organ discovers that any one of the following circumstances applies to an offender who has been released on medical parole, it shall report to the former prison of custody and immediately remand the offender to custody:

(1) Release on medical parole was obtained through fraud;

(2) Recovery from or basic improvement of the medical condition through treatment such that the offender may be returned to custody;

(3) Use of self-injury, self-maiming, fraud, or other means to intentionally prolong the medical parole period;

(4) Failure to receive medical treatment after release on medical parole;

(5) Repeated violation of monitoring and management rules, despite warnings.

Article 26: Any offender released on medical parole who violates these provisions shall, when the violation does not constitute a criminal offense, be subject to public-order management penalty by the public security organ in accordance with the law. When the violation constitutes a criminal offense, criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance with the law.

Article 27: When an offender released on medical parole reaches the end of his or her sentence, the public security organ shall immediately make a report to the prison where his or her sentence was originally served in order to carry out release procedures.

When an offender dies while released on medical parole, the public security organ shall immediately report to the prison that formerly held custody.

Section V. Additional Provisions

Article 28: These regulations shall take effect from the date of issue.