Xinjiang’s State Security Prisoners: Failing to Reform (Part 1 of 2)
Twelve men accused of ESS are publicly sentenced in Yili (Ili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Xinjiang, September 18, 2008. Photo credit: iyaxin.com
In 2008 the Xinjiang Rule of Law Leading Small Group published a policy document examining a number of challenges faced by prison authorities in managing the region’s prisoners serving sentences for endangering state security (ESS). The first two sections of the document are translated below. They discuss the climate surrounding Xinjiang prison work and the psychological profiles of ESS prisoners. The last two sections of the document, focusing on how to better reform ESS prisoners, will be translated in an upcoming post.
The document focuses on external factors, like increasing US attention to the “Xinjiang question” and the “three forces” of ethnic separatism, Islamic extremism, and terrorism. Also mentioned are internal factors, such as an insufficient number of prison police, a shortage of funds, and outdated facilities.
Over the years, Dui Hua has drawn on evidence from a variety of open-source documents to conclude that Xinjiang accounts for a considerable proportion of the nation’s ESS arrests, indictments, and trials. In 2008, Xinjiang accounted for more than 75 percent of ESS arrests and 82 percent of ESS indictments nationwide. In the first 11 months of that year, Xinjiang’s procuratorate reported that 1,295 individuals were arrested and 1,154 were indicted for ESS crimes in the region. Between 2008 and 2010, Xinjiang, which accounts for less than two percent of China’s population, accounted for 50 percent of the nation’s first-instance ESS trials. In 2013 and 2014, Xinjiang conducted about 300 ESS trials of first instance each year.
The large number of ESS cases in Xinjiang is connected to the region’s complex history; diverse population; and geo-strategic importance, bordering Russia and Central Asia on China’s northwest. The emergence of independent Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spread of Islamic ideologies have heightened Chinese authorities’ concerns about stability in the region. Authorities in Xinjiang see themselves as engaging in an ongoing battle against the “three forces.” In their view, what hangs in the balance is the stability of Xinjiang and the allegiance of the region’s 10 million Uyghurs—an ethnically Turkic, culturally distinct, and predominantly Muslim people who have been the main inhabitants of the region for more than 1,000 years.
The document describes the “American Factor” as a “constant threat” to Xinjiang’s social and political stability. It mentions US support for nonviolent resistance movements, or color revolutions, in Central Asia and notes that religious extremism has flourished in countries where color revolutions occurred. US interest in human rights in Xinjiang, particularly its criticism of controversial ESS cases like that of Ilham Tohti, remains a point of contention in US-China relations. China continues to see such attention as interference in its domestic affairs, and accuses the United States of a “double standard” in combatting terrorism for its penchant to draw attention to Chinese policies that marginalize and criminalize Uyghur culture in its response to ethnic clashes in Xinjiang.
Tensions between Han Chinese and Uyghurs flare up periodically as protest. Some of the protests turn violent, as in the deadly riots that erupted in Ürümqi in July 2009. In recent years official media have reported an increasing number of violent incidents in the region. Xinjiang police counted over 190 “terrorist” attacks in 2012. Authorities have also implicated Uyghurs in incidents outside the remote western region, including Beijing’s Tiananmen car crash in October 2013 and knife attacks at Kunming and Guangzhou train stations in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Law enforcement has responded by tightening controls on religious and cultural activities and cracking down on “infiltration” by trans-national radical groups.
One of the radical groups named in the paper is Hizb ut-Tahrir, or Party of Liberation. Many countries have banned the group. Chinese government records show that a substantial proportion of ESS cases are attributed to Hizb ut-Tahrir. For example, in 2010, police in Kashgar identified 522 people for their involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir, compared with just 47 people involved with the East Turkestan Islamic Party. That said, independent media reports documenting Hizb ut-Tahrir activity in Xinjiang are scarce.
Moving to psychological profiles, the document distinguishes different segments of Xinjiang’s ESS prisoner population by factors such as age, level of education, and exposure to religious ideas. The profiles suggest the need for differentiated strategies of “education and reform.” Prison authorities put considerable emphasis on the need to “convert” ESS offenders and replace their “bigoted” and “reactionary” ideas about ethnicity, religion, and history with proper Marxist understandings that reduce antagonism towards the party-state.
On the Current Situation and Countermeasures for Reform of ESS Prisoners under the New Circumstances [Excerpt] August 4, 2008
[The second two sections of this document are translated here.]
Summary: At present, reforming endangering state security (ESS) prisoners is an arduous and extremely difficult task. ESS prisoners in Xinjiang prisons display new characteristics in their opposition to reform. Their tactics have shifted from open opposition to a pretense of active obedience to management. [This makes] their actions more hidden, their nature more evil, and their threat more serious. For these reasons, we absolutely must not let down our guard and need to draw up a series of targeted, effective strategies and measures that will enable our work to be transformed from passive to active thereby fundamentally safeguarding the safety and stability of our prisons.
For many years, the work by Xinjiang prisons to reform ESS prisoners has been carried out according to the instructions and requirements of the central and regional [governments], closely adhering to the aims of prison work, putting the focus on raising the quality of prisoners’ education and reform, maintaining an emphasis on ensuring prison security and stability, and continually studying the education and reform methods and measures for ESS prisoners under the new circumstances. [In this way,] we have successfully converted a large number of ESS prisoner leaders and core members, protected the ordinary reform order inside the prisons, ensured the security and stability of the prisons, and achieved the targets of “admission” and “management.” But the current environment means that the situation facing Xinjiang prison work remains extremely serious and gives no cause for optimism. In particular, the task of reforming ESS prisoners is extremely difficult and reveals a number of new circumstances that must be given full attention and new problems that must urgently be resolved.
I. The Situation Facing Xinjiang Prison Work
For many years, Xinjiang prison correctional officers have undergone continuous study and training, and there has been a clear improvement in law-enforcement capabilities and standards among correctional officers of all ethnicities. With respect to prison management and [prisoner] reform, they have employed strong measures and methods, repeatedly uncovered many cases involving plans by ESS and [ordinary] criminal prisoners to attempt escape, violence, or prison break. [Prisoner] reform order is good inside the prisons. However, there remain elements that affect the security and stability of Xinjiang prisons, and mutually intertwined, complex, and variable characteristics have appeared, bringing great pressure and challenges to efforts to maintain prison stability.
Complex and changing international environment, rising terrorist threat, and new expressions of hegemonism and power politics. “American Factor” is a constant threat to Xinjiang’s social and political stability.
In recent years, the United States has paid increasingly direct and increasingly specific attention to the so-called “Xinjiang Question.” [The issue has been raised] at higher and higher levels, the scope has been increasingly broad, and knowledge has continuously increased, with the main focus involving Xinjiang’s human rights, ethnic, and religious problems. [The United States] is scheming to integrate ethnic separatist forces, increase the intensity of infiltration and sabotage in Xinjiang, and quicken the pace of “internationalizing the Xinjiang Question.” It is attempting to carry out a “peril from the east.”[1] Since 2005, the nations bordering Xinjiang have experienced a series of “color revolutions” carried out with planning and support from the United States. In these countries, social control has become weaker, religious extremist ideology has prevailed, and violent terrorist activity has been rampant, making the situation more and more complex in the area surrounding Xinjiang.
“Three forces” remain fully active inside and outside China
At present, the activities of the “three forces” [i.e., ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism] inside and outside China are most evident in three areas: first, further acceleration of the pace of uniting together, nationalizing, and politicizing; second, active plots of violent terrorist sabotage activity; and third, intensified incitement of public opinion and ideological infiltration. Each provides evidence that the “three forces” inside and outside China are currently plotting more sinister criminal activities and are capable of carrying out violent terrorist acts at any time, with prisons serving as one of their main targets of attack and sabotage.
Renewed Activity of “Hizb ut-Tahrir”
“Hizb ut-Tahrir” [Party of Liberation] is a transnational extremist political organization pursuing Islamic fundamentalism. While our government has struck back at its organized infiltration efforts numerous times, [Hizb ut-Tahrir] has been unwilling to accept defeat and has unceasingly engaged in sabotage activities in Xinjiang. Compared to the past, its organization has undergone a number of major changes, with increasingly apparent [efforts at] “localization,” “party building,” and “violence.”
Serious lack of correctional officers, serious imbalance of officer-prisoner ratio
The seriously insufficient [number] of correctional officers has already become a major factor influencing the security and stability of prisons and hindering the improved quality of prisoner reform. The contradiction of an insufficient officer force is particularly evident considering the unique nature of reforming ESS prisoners. We are a long way from meeting the Ministry of Justice requirement that “the ranks of prison correctional officers shall not fall below 18 percent of the prisoner population.” In our region, the ratio of assigned correctional officers to the prisoner population is only 15.1 percent.
Shortage of funds and outdated facilities
In recent years, with the hearty support of superior departments, the work of outfitting and making adjustments at Xinjiang prisons has proceeded smoothly, bringing some improvement to the outdated nature of basic prison facilities. But with pressure on prison management and reform work continually on the rise, the problems created by insufficient prison technological equipment and outdated techniques are increasingly obvious. We can wait no longer to establish a relatively complete technological prevention system for prison security.
II. Psychological Profile of ESS Prisoners
General Profile
Reactionary Political Thinking
After entering prison, some ESS prisoners do not recognize their own crimes and stubbornly maintain their reactionary stances, refusing to acknowledge guilt or accept the verdict. They maintain that they “obey the commands of Allah and have broken no laws”; that “the laws of the Communist Party do not apply to them”; or that their “crimes were not committed for themselves but on behalf of the independence and liberation of their ethnic group.” They even believe things such as that their actions were “[acts of] resistance under pressure.”
They pretend to have been tricked and resist thought reform. In order to avoid criminal responsibility, some ESS prisoners mistakenly believe that their crimes were instigated by others and that their ignorance led them to be tricked. They thus adopt a passive attitude toward political thought education during the reform process.
Stubborn Resistance to Reform
Most ESS prisoners harbor great feelings of resentment; avoid, and even treat as enemies, people of other ethnicities; and curse Uyghur police as the “scum of the ethnic group” and “running dogs of the Communist Party.” They willfully distort Xinjiang’s history, spread rumors, and incite ethnic hatred. They use acts like hunger strikes, suicide, “namaz” [the Turkish word for prayer], and feigned illness to disobey management and refuse reform.
They create serious disturbances and oppose management by correctional officers. Some ESS prisoners, once their fantasies of being “rescued” by people outside the prison are dashed, become desperate and openly defiant towards correctional officers. They refuse to obey orders and beat other prisoners. Some spread comments about refusing to reform and incite other prisoners to cause disturbances. Some directly take aim at correctional officers. Some ESS prisoners, in response to guards’ efforts to educate them, frequently shout things like: “I only act in accordance with the Quran. I will always follow Allah and never follow the Communist Party. I only obey Islamic law. If you become a Muslim, I will obey you.” Or they shout: “According to Chinese law I am guilty, but according to Islamic law I am innocent. I believe I have a duty to spread the tenets of Islam broadly. All that I have done is correct, and I shall never repent.”
Bigoted Ethnic Mentality, Inciting Religious Fervor, and Ethnic Opposition
The majority of ESS prisoners have a rather strong, bigoted ethnic mentality and see themselves as an “elite ethnicity” and “superior race” [2]. At the same time, they are unable to have a correct understanding of objective realities of other ethnic groups’ populations or levels of economic or cultural development, which leads them to develop psychological imbalances and spiritual distortions.
They incite religious fervor and engage in illegal religious activities. Investigation has found that the great majority of ESS prisoners have been deeply influenced by religion and that nearly 30 percent of them have even been educated in religious schools. They often use their common ethnicity and common religion to incite religious fervor among prisoners and try to use illegal religious methods to continue carrying out their separatist activities.
They stir up trouble and incite ethnic antagonism. They instigate and encourage prisoners newly admitted to prison to oppose management by correctional officers and deliberately manufacture trouble. They incite ethnic antagonism and manufacture ethnic contradictions in order to sabotage the ordinary reform order within the prison. Some brazenly announce: “Out with the Han!” or “Destroy the infidels!”
Weak Legal Knowledge and Resistance to New Things
The majority of ESS prisoners have a low level of education and suffer from “small peasant mentality” and narrow thinking. They neither study nor understand the law and are unwilling to accept the restraint of national law. They judge true and false and right and wrong only on the basis of the Quran, the “Hadith,” and the “commandments.” They know extremely little about the historical development of Xinjiang and do not understand the relationships between the nation, ethnic groups, and religion. Many of them believe that “nations should be integral units formed by a single ethnic group.”[3] For these reasons, they do not care about new things and even resist them. They have no interest in the “three courses” [i.e., ideology, civilization, and technology] and lack a consciousness to reform.
Categorical Profiles
The great majority of newly admitted ESS prisoners do not acknowledge guilt or accept the verdict and stubbornly maintain their reactionary positions. They believe that all they have done is in obedience to Allah’s decrees. Under the strict controls of prison, they continue to openly write reactionary journals, reactionary poetry, or publicly express reactionary comments, searching for opportunities to incite and recruit other prisoners.
The great majority of those serving short-term sentences pass the time by going through the motions and refusing to accept thought reform. A few ESS prisoners serving short terms will frequently observe the area surrounding the prison or the correctional officer deployment situation. There are some who intentionally commit crimes so that they may scout out the situation in the prison and make reports to ethnic separatist forces after leaving prison.
Some ESS prisoners serving long sentences believe that they have no hope of sentence reductions and lose faith in reform. A few even attack correctional officers or rush for the prison gates, taking these desperate measures without any concern for the consequences.
A few ESS prisoners who are about to be released seek out opportunities to make contact with other ESS prisoners, asking them about their “friends and relatives” outside of prison or giving other prisoners their contact details so that they might make contact after they leave prison and continue pursuing their so-called “endeavors.”
A few ESS prisoners who were leaders or core members possess extremely strong powers to draw people to them and incite them, making these prisoners ongoing risks. Periodically, former Hizb ut-Tahrir members will engage in separatist and sabotage activities in prison, such as making contact with each other, gathering together, recruiting [new members], and engaging in incitement.
[The final sections of this document will be translated in a subsequent post.]
Notes:
See Zhang Huazhong, “Characteristics, Trends, and Policies for Current Violent Terrorist Criminals,” in Research on Violent Terrorist Crime (Xinjiang People’s Publishing House, April 1999).
See Qian Shiwu and Sun Xinmin, “Characteristics of Violent Terrorist Criminals Held in Xinjiang and Measures for Their Control and Reform,” in Research on Violent Terrorist Crime.
See Yi Zheng, “Political Orientation of Xinjiang Violent Terrorist Activity,” in Research on Violent Terrorist Crime.
References:
Yang Zheng, Research on Violent Terrorist Crime (Xinjiang People’s Publishing House, April 1999).
Wang Jiye, “Leading All Aspects of Prison Work with Socialist Legal Institutions,” China Prisons, 2006(5).
Xinjiang Prison Studies Association, “Notes on Reforming ESS Prisoners in the Xinjiang Prison System,” Prison Research, 2005(12).
Li Weiguo and Sun Xinmin, “Analysis of Current Situation and Enhancement Approach for Control of ‘ESS Prisoners’ in the New Era,” Prison Research, 2006(5).
