Xinjiang’s State Security Prisoners: Failing to Reform (Part 2 of 2)

Twelve men accused of ESS are publicly sentenced in Yili (Ili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Xinjiang, September 18, 2008. Photo credit: iyaxin.com

In 2008 the Xinjiang Rule of Law Leading Small Group published a policy document examining a number of challenges faced by prison authorities in managing the region’s endangering state security (ESS) prisoners. The first two sections of the document, which discuss the situation facing Xinjiang prison work and the psychological profiles of ESS prisoners, are translated here. What follows is a translation of the last two sections of the document. These sections describe attitudes towards reform among ESS prisoners and methods for prisons to improve their reform work. The document emphasizes the “clear hostility” of ESS prisoners, noting that it is “extremely common” for them to resist reform.

The document observes that by concentrating ESS offenders, prisons become fertile grounds for reactionary groups to recruit members and may ultimately become targets for attack. The language used in this paper conveys the sense that prison authorities are engaged in battle with enemy forces on China’s frontier and that, in the interest of “stability above all else,” military-level investments in personnel, equipment, and facilities are necessary.

Prisons are instructed to “strategically despise all enemies but tactically take [them] seriously” and to “divide and demoralize.” In some cases, the document specifically calls for solitary confinement, fixed sleeping positions, and prohibitions on sitting.

Among the groups identified in the document as a proponent of the “three forces” of ethnic separatism, Islamic extremism, and terrorism is the East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP). Chinese officials have ascribed a number of bombings and hijackings to the group, which was labeled a terrorist organization by the US government in 2002. As recently as May 2015, Mettursun Eziz was sentenced to four years’ in prison for circulating religious materials produced by ETIP.

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On the Current Situation and Countermeasures for Reform of
ESS Prisoners under the New Circumstances [Excerpt]
August 4, 2008

[The first two sections of this document are translated here.]

III. Reform Situation

1. Basic Situation
   
   The number of endangering state security (ESS) offenders in Xinjiang prisons has risen annually since 2000. Prior to being arrested, these ESS offenders mainly resided in four regions: Kashgar, Hotan, and Aksu in southern Xinjiang and the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture. People between the ages of 18 and 40 account for a relatively large number of these ESS prisoners, revealing that young men are always the main targets for recruiting and training by ethnic separatists. An increasing number of these prisoners are serving long sentences, and fewer serving short terms. From this, we can see two things. On the one hand, the intensity of our strikes against ESS offenders has been increasing, and the battle against them intensifies every day. On the other hand, [the phenomenon of] ESS crime is becoming increasingly acute, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to reform ESS prisoners. The process of educating and converting ESS prisoners is complicated, and the responsibility is formidable. Moreover, as the number of ESS offenders who have completed their sentences and been released from prison increases, the work of post-release monitoring and “rehabilitation” becomes even more difficult.
   
2. Current Reform Situation
   
   At present, one can say that the reform of ESS prisoners is mostly in a stage of equilibrium. But because these prisoners are influenced by a special mentality, social background, and religious ideology, one can identify two or even more extremes in the overall development trend for the reform of ESS prisoners. This mainly manifests itself in the following five forms.
   
1. Those who increase their understanding and gradually convert. This type accounts for 2.39 percent of ESS prisoners. Most are relatively young, have had relatively little religious influence, have a relatively high level of education, and were accomplices in their crimes. After a certain period of education and reform, they are able not only to acclimate to the reform environment but to more easily accept new knowledge and ideas. These are the easiest ESS prisoners to reform.
2. Those who sit back and observe, hesitating to move forward. This type accounts for 19.22 percent of ESS prisoners. Most of them lack fully developed thinking, are somewhat less affected by narrow ethnic or religious views, and lack willpower and judgment. Although they recognize that maintaining ethnic separatist views does not have positive results, they do not recognize that prisons are resolute in striking against ethnic separatists. They are unable to grasp the opportunity to reform. They hesitate, watch those around them, leave things to chance, and go with the flow. In the course of education and reform, it is only necessary to appeal to emotion or reason to make them recognize that ethnic separatism has no future and is a dead-end; then they are easy to convert.
3. Those who follow the crowd and parrot what others say. This group accounts for 36.43 percent of ESS prisoners. Most of them are not set in their thinking and have rather large mood swings. They have incorrect views about ethnicity and religion, have a difficult time properly distinguishing fact from fiction, and have a low level of education. In the process of reform, they run hot and cold, do not have thoughts of their own, vary in their zeal for reform, and are easily influenced by ESS prisoners around them and by other relevant matters.
4. Those who pretend to follow one path but secretly pursue another. This type accounts for 30.53 percent of ESS prisoners but has quite serious negative side effects. Typically, this kind of person was a principal, leading, or core member of a criminal gang and possesses more systematic reactionary thinking and stronger organizational powers and influence. During the process of reform, they appear to have a positive attitude and submit to management, are eloquent, and exhibit a relatively good attitude towards acknowledging guilt. But deep down they continue to possess extremely strong anti-social and separatist thinking, and they maintain an attitude of stubborn resistance throughout the process of reform. In prison management work, it takes extra effort to control and educate this type of person.
5. Those with stubborn thinking and a greater potential for risk. There are relatively few of this type, about 11.52 percent of [ESS prisoners], but their ethnic separatist and extreme religious ideologies are deep-rooted. After entering prison they typically maintain an attitude of refusal to stop until their goals are achieved, causing their criminal motivations to grow stronger. On the one hand, they seek ways to make contact with ethnic separatist forces remaining outside prison. On the other hand, they wait for opportunities to link up within the prison, continue to propagate their ethnic separatist speech and ideas, and carry out illegal religious activity in vain hope that, once the time is right, they can carry out violence or organize an escape, prison riot, or prison break and kill prison guards and civilians. If they were ever able to carry out their plans successfully, the consequences would be too terrible to imagine.
3. Clear Hostility
   
   In recent years, it has become extremely common for ESS prisoners to resist reform, engage in sabotage, and plot disturbances and riots. This can mainly be seen from the following new tendencies and characteristics.
   
1. Members who are secretly recruited and trained conspire over a long period of time, carry out more covert and odious actions, and cause more serious harm as they intensify their plots to carry out organized and planned disruptions and riots in prison. For example, on March 15, 2005, a certain prison uncovered a major case of conspiracy involving four ESS prisoners who had recruited a total of 34 ESS and ordinary prisoners, since June 2004, to form an “East Turkestan Islamic Party.” The group secretly plotted to make contacts inside and outside the prison and to carry out mass disturbances and riots. There are several characteristics of this case. First, the goal was absolutely clear—to establish an organization with ties inside and outside the prison, carry out a prison break, and ultimately establish an “East Turkestan Republic.” Second, after secret plotting on numerous occasions, they drew up an extremely complete plan for a prison break. Third is the well-established manner in which members of the organization communicated, divided up labor, and exerted control over one other. Fourth is the broad scope whereby targets were recruited. The large number of people involved in the case, length of time of the conspiracy, size of the organization, and thoroughness of the planning are all something rarely seen in the past decade. Were the plan to have succeeded, the consequences would be unimaginable.
2. Former “Hizb ut-Tahrir” members continue to propagate their reactionary ideas in prison and have intensified their conspiratorial activities to establish reactionary groups, recruit members, plot disturbances and prison breaks, and ultimately establish a “caliphate” government. After entering prison, former Hizb ut-Tahrir members commonly do not acknowledge guilt or accept the verdict against them. They stubbornly maintain their reactionary views and seek opportunities to provoke incidents. On May 7, 2005, Changji Prison uncovered a case of members of the reactionary group circulating written information about Hizb ut-Tahrir. They secretly recruited members in a planned, orderly, and purposeful manner in an attempt to accomplish something bigger, like a prison riot or prison break. The chief culprit, [name redacted], recruited 22 members and organized three group networks. Afterwards, eight other similar cases were uncovered in succession, fully reflecting the intensity and complexity of the battle against Hizb ut-Tahrir.
3. Former violent terrorists, with a deep resentment of our government and prison correctional officers, attempt to use violent terrorist means to kill us. They resist reform activities in increasingly arrogant and brazen means like gathering together to create disturbances and seizing opportunities to concoct incidents. On May 29, 2005, immediately after an ESS prisoner was put in solitary confinement for violating discipline in a certain prison, 27 ESS prisoners collectively went on strike and created a disturbance in the prison. They made unreasonable demands about removing that ESS prisoner from solitary confinement and changing the prisoner monitors. After a probing and detailed investigation, the prison uncovered a core of four ESS prisoners as well as 34 people who were either involved in the case or participated in activities of the “East Turkestan Islamic Liberation Organization.” In August of the same year, investigation also uncovered a case of major conspiracy led by four ESS prisoners and involving 11 criminals. On November 14, 2004, these prisoners made an oath to form a “bayat” [i.e., “oath of allegiance”] organization, secretly recruited members, and attempted to collaborate with forces outside the prison to murder police guards and collectively break out.　
   With respect to the main prisoners involved in the aforementioned cases, the Xinjiang Prison Bureau requested sentence extensions in accordance with the law in December of last year. Nonetheless there remain some prisoners who continue to have an attitude of refusing to acknowledge guilt and to display extreme resentment. Some engage in self-mutilation, slash their wrists, bite off their tongues, or try to kill themselves by smashing into walls; some threaten police guards, openly saying “if you sentence me, I won’t live”; some use the excuse of illness and make unreasonable demands in an attempt to escape legal sanctions.　
   
4. Intense infiltration of “three forces” [elements] into prisons presents new and more serious challenges to our anti-infiltration and anti-prison-break work. This mainly manifests itself in the following. Separatists outside the prison intentionally commit crimes to “break in” to the prison, gather intelligence, and recruit members. There is increased use of video cameras, cameras, and binoculars outside the prison walls by people of unclear backgrounds who photograph and view the situation inside the prison walls. There is continual intensification in the use of the mail to send money and items [into the prison], carry out reactionary propaganda infiltration on incarcerated ESS prisoners, and use secret codes in an attempt to establish contacts with those outside the prison. There are those who make secret connections inside and outside and await “rescue” by separatist groups outside the prison. On several occasions, prisons that hold ESS prisoners have discovered that ESS prisoners’ relatives have sent reactionary letters encouraging prisoners to maintain their reactionary standpoints and separatist ideas and await “rescue.”

IV. Methods for Improving Education and Reform of ESS Prisoners

In light of the new circumstances and problems surrounding the reform of ESS prisoners, Xinjiang prison work must always firmly plant the idea of “stability above all else.” We must closely ensure unwavering focus on prison security and stability by continually improving the party’s leadership over prison work and building and perfecting enduring mechanisms for prison security and stability. We must always maintain the focus of prison work on severe combat against the sabotage activity of “three forces” inside the prison and on reforming ESS prisoners. This should be emphasized as important over the long term. Special effort should be made to strengthen the management of ESS prisoners and raise the quality of reform.

1. Continue to increase intra-prison investigation, taking account of hostility and criminality.
1. Continually improve the investigation and study of prison and enemy intelligence. Dedicate intensive research to ESS prisoners’ criminal psychology, patterns of reform, and specific countermeasures. Explore and summarize past experience and methods to guide future practice, and enhance professional strengths.
2. Organize a tightly controlled, rationally arranged, and high-quality network of informants. Strictly implement a reward-and-punishment system for informants, and use formal, administrative, and material means to motivate them. In particular, establish a system to pay informants and use other practical measures to encourage them.
3. Gradually shift the focus of prison investigation work to combatting serious behaviors aimed at resisting reform. With respect to some serious reform-resistance behavior that does not constitute new criminal activity according to the current legal framework, we need to employ strategies, collect evidence, solidify evidence, and actively communicate with the relevant authorities in order to use legal methods to carry out a reasonable, effective, firm, and severe crackdown in practice.
4. Maintain good experiences and practices, such as making prevention the focus, treating small things as if they were major, and “fixing the barn door before the horse is lost.” Aim to uncover major cases during the conspiracy stage and eliminate all kinds of new criminal activity at their inception. In addition to standardizing daily work routines, we need to increase funding, improve investigative equipment and facilities within the prison, pay attention to employing modern detection technology, and improve the overall efficacy of investigation within the prison.
2. Exemplify targeted management of ESS prisoners, taking account of ESS prisoners’ characteristics.
1. Implement and refine categorized management. Use scientific methods of classifying ESS prisoners according to the different natures of their crimes and their different social backgrounds, psychological profiles, ideological bases, and behavioral displays. Remain firm in carrying out separate detention of leaders, core members, and dangerous elements.
2. In the course of daily management, uphold the “four stricts” of strict management, strict education, strict crackdown, and strict prevention. Intensify the punishment and crackdown against those who dare to reveal themselves, making them truly feel the severity of the law and the force of dictatorship. For the main suspects in a case, employ separate or isolated detention; carry out 24-hour monitoring by prisoner monitors and daily, unscheduled patrols by correctional officers from the functional office; and have on-duty correctional officers carry out daily body searches and inspections of beds and cells. For dangerous individuals connected to a case, carry out detention using restraints in accordance with the law. Implement a system of fixed positions for sleep and prevention of sitting and movement for those involved in a case. Strictly implement a specific accountability system and arrange for correctional officers with a strong sense of responsibility and professional character to take responsibility for management and education.
3. Enhance the management of ESS prisoners’ labor. Adjust the projects and times for ESS prisoners’ labor. If anything is inappropriate as labor to be carried out by ESS prisoners, it must be resolutely canceled.
3. Make further use of the ability of education and reform to address the root of the problem and increase the quality of ESS prisoners’ reform
1. Periodically hold special meetings regarding education work. Analyze and study the new circumstances and problems that arise in the course of education and reform work for ESS prisoners and enact targeted measures and methods to raise the relevance of this work.
2. Speed up the compilation and improvement of targeted teaching materials. Mainly include content on: Marxist worldview, philosophy, and values; national, ethnic, religious, historical, and cultural views; and Xinjiang’s history and development, current events, and politics.
3. In light of the realities of ESS prisoners’ mentalities, place the focus on increasing political thought education that is targeted, flexible, and varied. Avoid boring study methods like reading the newspaper or textbooks, and fully take advantage of myriad educational methods such as lectures, one-on-one education, using cases to study the law, analyzing classic cases, and speaking of the law from personal experience.
4. Further intensify one-on-one education. Under the current conditions of correctional officer scarcity, focus on one-on-one education for target prisoner groups like ESS prisoners and stubborn ESS prisoners. Actively take advantage of the function of one-on-one education to attack the mind of ESS prisoners. Establish three levels of one-on-one education [to be carried out by] prison leadership, the functional office, and unit guards as a network for guaranteeing education and reform.
5. Properly carry out assault and conversion work targeting “stubborn ESS prisoners.” Extend the experience of selected pilot efforts to the whole, putting the stress on effectiveness. Promote experiences of educating and converting ESS prisoners, and, when targeting stubborn elements, employ strategies of “strategically despise all enemies but tactically take our enemies seriously” and “gather the majority, isolate the minority, treat them differently, divide and demoralize.” Launch an education campaign to attack and convert 100 stubborn ESS prisoners. Increase the conversion rate by employing effective measures that concentrate advantages of police force and energies like concentrated classes, responsibility contracts, close supervision, and conversion deadlines. Go on the offensive to educate “stubborn ESS prisoners” on policies, laws, the general situation, and morality in order to target their reactionary thinking and ideas.
4. Wield the Might of Policy and Uphold the “Four Combines”
   While educating and reforming ESS prisoners, respect the fundamental principles of individualized education, categorization, and management and persuasion through reasoning. Properly grasp the four areas of indoctrination, guidance, penetration, and criticism and uphold the “four combines,” namely, combine strengthened indoctrination and self-education, combine ideological education and psychological treatment, combine collective attacks with individualized education, and combine the attack-and-convert strategy with consolidating results. Fully wield the power of the party’s ethnic and religious policies and national laws and strengthen the ideological education of ESS prisoners.
   
1. Proceed from a practical basis, strengthen “three courses” education, and fully promote basic education. In the content of “three courses” education, target the special criminal thinking of ESS prisoners and place emphasis on patriotism, ethnic and religious policies, and political ideological education regarding the general situation, legal system, and morality. Educate using useful passages from the Islamic Quran that can correct criminal thinking, for example content regarding doing good deeds and prohibitions on evil as well as on love, honesty, equality, and forgiveness. Focus on ESS prisoners who do not understand Chinese or are illiterate by carrying out cultural education to eradicate illiteracy and study Chinese. Encourage ESS prisoners with relatively good behavior to participate in adult university self-study examinations and strengthen technological and technical education and training, especially in practical technologies.
2. Use scientific techniques and fully make use of the functions of psychological therapy in reforming criminals, making education and reform deeper and more detailed. Utilize the scientific methods of psychological therapy, set up archives, and provide scientific bases for establishing a targeted educational program. Fully understand all aspects of ESS prisoners’ psychological profiles as they relate to social behavior, including personalities, temperament, interests, emotions, attitudes, beliefs, value systems, and interpersonal relations, and establish a psychological file for each ESS prisoner. Design questionnaires based on the content and methods of the prison’s “three courses” and its management and education needs, carry out deep investigation and screening classification of ESS prisoners, and analyze and research ESS prisoners’ mental characteristics in order to serve as a holistic basis for accurately grasping their basic situation.
3. Maintain close cooperation with all sides and open up new roads to education and reform. Establish a global view; strengthen coordinated combat operations and broaden channels by combining forces within the prison’s departments of education, prison administration, prison investigation, and production labor; and continually seek new methods, roads, and channels for education and reform, taking greater and greater steps towards a systematized, standardized, scientific, and modern system of education and reform.
5. Take Resolute Steps to Enhance the Quality of Correctional Officers
1. Strengthen education on political views and beliefs in order to enable guards of all ethnicities to come of their own accord to stand on the front lines of the battle against separatism. When it comes to questions of major principles involving national interests and the interests of individual ethnic groups, always achieve unequivocal understanding, unambiguous attitudes, and unwavering action.　
2. Strengthen education regarding the Marxist view on ethnic groups and the party’s ethnic and religious policies, deepen anti-separatist ideological education and education regarding Xinjiang history.
3. Conduct planned training on religious knowledge for correctional officers who educate and reform ESS prisoners. Hold training classes and organize patriotic religious figures to lecture guards at the prison in order to help them understand necessary religious knowledge. Require that correctional officers pay attention to accumulating basic knowledge about Islam, ethnic customs, psychology, and history in the course of their daily work, study, and lives.
4. Continue to carry out “bilingual” study activities for all correctional officers, with ethnic minorities learning Chinese and Han studying ethnic minority languages. Work hard to cultivate a corps of specialized teachers and education experts skilled at implementing ethnic and religious policies and laws, and establish a special correctional officer training corps for managing and educating ESS prisoners.
6. Further Enhance Construction of Technologies for Prison Security and Prevention
1. All high-security prisons housing ESS prisoners should install high-functioning prison security and prevention technology systems, including multimedia monitoring, intercom calling, emergency alarms, interview listening, perimeter-intrusion detection, smart grid, and access control functions.　
2. Recommend distributing a certain amount of non-ESS prisoners who nevertheless possess ethnic separatist tendencies in prisons throughout Xinjiang. To this end, all medium-security prison farms should have at least one target section that employs the best security and prevention technology according to high-security prison standards.
3. Given the special regional circumstances of Xinjiang, ordinary prisons should also install necessary monitoring systems.
4. Set up a local area computer network to cover the entire prison system, achieving remote monitoring of targeted prisons. The local monitoring control center may, as needed, carry out appropriate monitoring of targeted sections of targeted prisons and carry out remote command during emergency incidents in order to strengthen the ability to handle emergency incidents.
5. Gradually set up an electronic education system to reduce the opportunities for prisoners to use the large-scale gatherings that occur during class time to make contact with one another.
6. Set up prison administration information management systems in select prisons.

In summary, we must always clearly recognize the long-term, complex, and difficult nature of reforming ESS prisoners. While we implement each type of effective management measure, we must remain unwavering in remaining centered on the task of improving the quality of education and reform and having this central task lead our other work. Through continually strengthening education and reform measures, improving the quality of education and conversion, and truly grasping the laws of criminal reform, we are able to transform from passive defense to active attack. Only in this way can we fundamentally safeguard the security and stability of our prisons.

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References:

1. Yang Zheng, Research on Violent Terrorist Crime (Xinjiang People’s Publishing House, April 1999).
2. Wang Jiye, “Leading All Aspects of Prison Work with Socialist Legal Institutions,” China Prisons, 2006(5).
3. Xinjiang Prison Studies Association, “Notes on Reforming ESS Prisoners in the Xinjiang Prison System,” Prison Research, 2005(12).
4. Li Weiguo and Sun Xinmin, “Analysis of Current Situation and Enhancement Approach for Control of ‘ESS Prisoners’ in the New Era,” Prison Research, 2006(5).

Chinese Source（原文）: 试论新形势下危安犯的改造现状及对策 http://www.fzxj.cn/view.asp?id=12152

三、改造状况

（一）基本情况

从2000年以来危安犯在押情况来看，新疆危安犯呈逐年增长的趋势。在押危安犯捕前主要分布在南疆喀什、和田、阿克苏、伊犁四个地区。其中18-40岁年龄段的危安犯较多，这表明青壮年人始终是民族分裂份子培养和发展的重点对象。而且重刑犯越来越多，轻刑犯相对减少。由此可以看出：一方面，我们对危害国家安全犯罪分子打击力度在不断加大，与危害国家安全犯罪分子的斗争日趋激烈；另一方面，危害国家安全犯罪在不断加剧，对危安犯的改造难度也越来越大，同时教育转化危安犯的过程曲折，任务艰巨。并且，随着危安犯刑释人数的增加进一步加大了对这些人员接茬监控及帮教的难度。

（二）改造现状

当前，对危安犯的改造，总的来讲处于较平衡阶段，但由于受其思想特点、社会背景及宗教意识等因素影响，危安犯在改造中整体上呈现出两极甚至多极分化的发展态势，具体主要表现为以下五种形式。

1. 认识提高，逐步转化。此种类型危安犯约占2.39%。这部分人大多是年龄偏低，受宗教影响较轻，文化程度相对较高，犯罪中处于从犯地位。经过一定时期的教育改造，他们不仅能较快地适应改造环境，还较易于接受新知识、新观念的灌输，属于危安犯中的易改造部分。
2. 坐以观望，徘徊不前。这种状况的危安犯约占19.22%。他们大多思想不太成熟，受狭隘民族观、宗教观影响较少，缺乏意志力和判断力。他们虽然认识到坚持民族分裂的观点没有好结果，但却看不清监狱坚决打击民族分裂主义分子的形势，不能恰当把握改造时机，犹豫不决，瞻前顾后，抱着侥幸心理随大流。在教育改造中，只要对其动之以情，晓之以理，让其认识到民族分裂是没有前途的，是死路一条，也是易于转化的。
   
3. 随波逐流，人云亦云。此种危安犯约占36.43%。他们大多数思想不稳定，情绪波动较大，民族、宗教观念不正确，明辨是非能力差，文化程度低。在改造中，忽冷忽热，没有主见，改造积极性忽高忽低，易受周围危安犯及相关事态的影响。
4. 明修栈道，暗渡陈仓。这种危安犯约占30.53%。但他们所起的负作用却相当大。这种人一般是犯罪团伙中的主犯、首犯或骨干，有较系统的反动思想，较强的组织能力和影响力。他们在改造中表面上积极主动，能服从管理，能言善辩，认罪态度较好，但内心反社会思想、分裂思想极为顽固，在改造中抱着顽抗到底的态度。这些人是监管工作中需要着重进行管束和教育的对象。
5. 思想顽固，潜在危险性大。这些罪犯人数较少，约占11.52%左右。但民族分裂和极端宗教思想根深蒂固，入监后往往抱着不达目的誓不罢休的意识，导致其犯罪动机的持续和强化。他们一方面想方设法与狱外残余的民族分裂主义势力勾结；另一方面伺机在狱内进行串联，继续宣传其民族分裂主义言论思想和进行非法宗教活动，妄想时机一旦成熟，就付诸暴力、组织越狱、暴狱、劫狱，杀害民警和群众。倘若他们的图谋得逞，后果不堪设想。

（三）突出敌情

近年来，在押危安犯的抗改、破坏和预谋闹监、暴狱等又犯罪活动十分活跃，主要表现在以下新的动向和特点：

1. 密谋时间长、行动更加隐蔽、性质更加恶劣、危害更加严重的秘密发展和培养成员，妄图进行有组织、有计划的闹监、暴狱的预谋活动加剧。例2005年3月15日，某监狱破获了一起以四名危安犯为首，自2004年6月以来拉拢发展了共计34名危安犯和刑事犯成立“东突厥斯坦伊斯兰党”，密谋策划、内外勾结、集体闹监暴狱的重大预谋案件。这起案件的特点：一是目的十分明确，就是要成立组织、内外勾结实施暴狱，最终成立“东突厥斯坦伊斯兰共和国”。二是通过多次密谋，制定了十分周末的暴狱计划。三是组织成员之间的联系、分工以及控制组织成员的手段十分严密。四是发展拉拢组织成员对象范围十分广泛。 这起案件涉案人数之众、密谋时间之长、组织规模之大、预谋计划之周密、都堪称近十年来所罕见，一旦得逞，其后果不堪设想。
2. 原“伊扎布特”组织成员在狱内继续宣传反动思想，成立反动组织、发展组织成员，妄图闹监、暴监，最终成立“哈力发”国家的阴谋活动加剧。原伊扎布特反动组织成员入狱后普遍不认罪，不服判，顽固坚持反动立场，寻机挑起事端。2005年5月7日，昌吉监狱破获了一起伊扎布特反动组织成员在狱内利用书写传阅伊扎布特反动组织知识，有计划、有步骤、有目的的秘密发展组织成员，妄图做大成势，闹狱暴狱的案件。其中主犯阿某发展成员22名，并组建3个组织网络，此外还相继破获了8起相同案件。这些都充分反映出与伊扎布特组织斗争的尖锐性、复杂性。
3. 对我政府和监狱民警刻骨仇恨，企图通过暴力恐怖手段置我于死地的原暴力恐怖分子，结伙闹事，寻机制造事端的抗改活动气焰更加嚣张。2005年5月29日，某监狱一名危安犯因违纪被禁闭后，立即有27名危安犯集体罢工、闹监，并提出解除该名危安犯的禁闭、撤换监督犯等无理要求。该监通过深挖细查，破获了以4名危安犯为核心，34人涉案或参加的“东突厥斯坦伊斯兰解放组织”活动，同年8月又侦破了一起以4名危安犯为主、11名罪犯涉案，于2004年11月14日，经过宣誓成立的“百叶提”组织，秘密发展成员，妄图里应外合，杀害民警，集体冲监暴狱的重大预谋案件。
   对上述几起案件的主要涉案罪犯，新疆监狱局已分别于去年12月，依法提请加刑。但仍有部分罪犯持拒不认罪的态度，表现出强烈的抵触情绪。有的实施自残、割腕、咬舌、撞墙实施自杀；有的威胁民警，公开扬言“如果给我判刑，我就不活了”；有的以患病为借口，提出无理要求，企图逃脱法律的制裁。
4. “三股势力”向狱内进行渗透加剧，防渗透、防劫狱工作，面临新的、更严峻的考验。主要表现在：狱外分裂分子故意犯罪，“打入”监狱、收集情报、发展成员；不明身份的成员在监狱的大墙外围用摄像机、照相机、望远镜等拍摄、窥探监狱大墙内情况的活动加剧；利用写信、寄钱寄物等方式，向狱内危安犯进行反动宣传渗透，以及通过暗语企图内外勾结的活动，不断加剧；密谋进行内外勾结，期待狱外分裂组织来“解救”，关押危安犯的监狱多次查获危安犯的亲属等鼓动罪犯在狱内坚持反动立场，坚持分裂信念，等待“营救”的反动信件。

四、 加强危安犯教育改造的对策

针对改造危安犯工作中出现的新情况、新问题，新疆监狱工作要始终牢固树立“稳定压倒一切”的思想，紧紧抓住监狱安全稳定这个中心不动摇，不断加强党对监狱工作的领导，不断构建和完善监狱安全稳定长效机制，始终坚持把严厉打击狱内“三股势力”的破坏活动和改造危安犯作为监狱工作的重点，长期放在突出重要的位置，专门强化对危安犯的管理，提高改造质量。

（一）结合敌情、犯情特点，不断加大狱内侦察工作力度。

1. 不断加强狱情、敌情调查研究，深入研究危安犯的犯罪心理、改造规律和具体对策，探索、总结经验做法指导实践。加强业务方面的力量。
2. 组建起控制严密、布建合理、高质量的耳目网络。严格落实耳目使用奖惩制度，切实从形式上、行政上、物质上调动耳目的积极性，特别是设立耳目经费，采取实实在在的激励措施。
3. 逐渐将狱侦工作的中心调整到打击严重抗改行为上来。对一些在现有法律框架内未构成从新犯罪的严重抗改行为，要运用谋略，搜集证据、固定证据，积极与有关部门沟通，切实在实践中通过法律手段进行有理、有力、坚决而严厉地打击。
4. 坚持预防为主、小题大做、未亡羊、先补牢等好的经验和做法，立足把各种重特大案件破获在预谋阶段，把各种从新犯罪活动消灭在萌芽之中。规范日常工作的同时，加大经费投入，改善狱侦器材和装备，注重运用现代侦察技术，提高狱侦工作综合效能。

（二） 结合危安犯特点，突出危安犯管理的针对性。

1. 落实、细化分类管理。针对不同的犯罪性质、社会背景、心理结构、思想基础和行为表现等情况，对危安犯进行科学分类，坚决对头目、骨干、危险份子进行单独关押。
2. 日常管理中，坚持严管、严教、严打、严防的“四严”措施。对敢于露头的，加大惩罚和打击力度，使其真正感受到法律的威严和专政的力量。对主要涉案人员，采取单独关押或隔离关押，实行监督犯24小时监控、职能科室民警每天不定时巡查，值班民警每天对其搜身，清查床铺、住所；对个别具有危险性的涉案人员依法实行夹带戒具关押；实行设涉案人员睡觉、禁坐和活动位置固定制度；严格落实专人负责制度，安排责任心强、业务素质高的民警负责管理、教育。
3. 加强危安犯劳动管理。调整危安犯劳动项目和劳动时间，凡是不适合危安犯劳动的必须坚决撤掉。

（三）进一步发挥教育改造工作的治本功能，提高危安犯改造质量

1. 定期召开教育工作专题会议。分析、研究危安犯教育改造工作中出现的新情况、新问题，制订针对性措施和方法，提高教育改造工作的针对性。
2. 加紧编写和完善针对性的教材。教材内容主要包括：马克思注意世界观、人生观、价值观及国家观、民族观、宗教观、历史观、文化观和新疆历史与发展、时事政治等。
3. 结合危安犯思想实际，重点加强针对性强、灵活多样的政治思想教育，避免读报纸、读教育课本等枯燥的学习方式，充分发挥上大课教育、个别教育及以案说法、典型分析、现身说法等各类教育方式的作用。
4. 进一步加强个别教育工作力度，在目前警力不足的情况下，将个别教育的重点放在危安犯、顽危犯等重点罪犯上，积极发挥个别教育在改造危安犯中的攻心作用，建立监狱领导、职能科室、中队干警、三级个别教育、包教包转化网络。
5. 做好“顽危犯”的攻坚转化工作，以点带面，突出效果。推广教育转化危安犯工作经验，对危安犯中的顽危份子，运用“战略上藐视敌人，战术上重视敌人”、“增取多数，孤立少数，区别对待，分化瓦解”的策略，开展百名顽危犯攻坚转化教育活动。采取集中优势警力和精力实行集中办班、责任承包、挂牌攻坚、限期转化等有效方法，提高转化率，。针对“顽危犯”的反动思想、观点的要害，进行政策、法律、形势、道德等内容的攻势教育。

（四）发挥政策威力，坚持“四个结合”

在对危安犯的教育改造中，我们遵循因人施教、分类，管理、以理服人的基本原则，抓好灌输、引导、渗透、批判四个环节，坚持“四个结合”，即强化灌输与自我教育相结合，思想意识教育与罪犯心理矫治相结合、集中攻坚与个别教育相结合、攻坚转化与巩固成果相结合，充分发挥党的民族宗教政策和国家法律的威力，强化对危安犯的思想教育。

1. 从实际出发，强化“三课”教育，全面推进基础教育工作。在“三课”教育的内容上，针对危安犯的犯罪思想特征，着重进行爱国主义、民族宗教政策及形势、法制、道德等思想政治教育，其中还运用伊斯兰教《古兰经》中有益的内容，如善行、戒恶、慈爱、诚信、平等、宽恕等有利于矫正罪犯思想的内容，对其进行教育；针对危安犯不懂汉语、文盲多的特点，开展以扫盲、学汉语为主的文化教育，并鼓励表现较好的危安犯参加成人高等教育自学考试，加大以实用技术为主的技术、技能教育培养。
2. 运用科学手段，充分发挥心理矫治在改造罪犯中的作用，深化细化教育改造工作。运用心理矫治的科学方法，建立资料库，为制定有针对性的教育方案提供科学依据。从心理学角度全面了解危安犯的性格、气质、兴趣、情感、态度、信念、价值观、人际关系等与社会行为有关的各种心理特点，对每个危安犯都建立心理档案。根据监狱开展“三课”教育的内容、方式以及管理、教育工作需要自行编制调查问卷，对危安犯进行深度调查和甄别分类，分析、研究危安犯的思想特征，为准确掌握其基本情况提供充分的依据。
3. 各方密切配合，开拓教育改造新路。树立全局观念，强化教育、狱政、狱侦、生产劳动等各部门的协同作战，整合力量，拓宽途径，不断探求教育改造工作的新方法、新路子、新途径，使教育改造工作逐步向系统化、规范化、科学化和现代化的更高层次迈进。

（五）狠抓民警队伍综合素质建设

1. 加强政治立场、政治信念的教育使各族民警自觉站到反分裂斗争前线，在事关国家利益和个民族根本利益的大事大非问题中，始终做到认识不含糊，态度不暧昧，行动不动摇。
2. 加强马克思注意民族观和党的民族宗教政策教育，深化意识形态领域的反分裂斗争教育和新疆历史的教育。
3. 有计划的对从事危安犯教育改造的民警进行宗教知识培训，举办培训班，组织爱国宗教人士到监狱对民警进行宗教知识专题讲座，使民警能够掌握必要的宗教知识，要求民警在日常的工作、学习、生活中注意积累伊斯兰教常识、少数民族民俗、心理学常识、历史学常识等。
4. 继续在全体民警中开展少数民族民警学习汉语，汉族民警学习少数民族语言的“双语”学习活动，努力培养一批执行民族宗教政策法律水平高的专职师职队伍和教育能手，组建一支专门监管、教育危安犯的民警教师队伍。

（六）进一步加强监狱安全技术防范技术建设

1. 所有关押危安犯的高度戒备监狱，应该装备包括多媒体监控、对讲机呼叫、紧急报警、接见监听、周界防入侵探测、智能电网、门禁等内容的，功能完善的监狱安全技术防范系统。
2. 建议将相当一部分不是危安犯但具有民族分裂主义倾向的分布在全疆各监狱之中。为此，所有中度戒备的农业监狱至少要有一个重点监区，按高度戒备的标准，配备完善的安全技术防范系统。
3. 由于新疆地区特殊情况，一般监狱也要装备必要的监控系统。
4. 建立覆盖全监狱系统的监狱计算机区域网，实现对重点监狱的远程监控指挥，局监控指挥中心可根据需要对重点监狱的重点部位进行适时监控，并对突发事件实施远程指挥，提高处置突发事件的能力。
5. 逐步建立电化教学系统，减少罪犯通过大范围集中上课进行串联的机会。
6. 在重点监狱建立狱政管理信息系统。

综上所述，我们要始终清醒地认识到改造危安犯工作的长期性、复杂性、艰巨性，在落实各项行之有效的管理措施的同时，坚定不移地围绕以提高教育改造质量为中心这个根本任务，以中心工作带动其他工作。通过不断地强化教育改造措施、提高教育转化质量，切实把握罪犯改造规律，使我们从被动防御转变为主动进攻，也只有这样才能从根本上保障监狱的安全稳定。

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参考文献：

1. 扬征，《暴力恐怖犯罪研究》。新疆人民出版社，1999年4月。
2. 王吉业，《以社会主义法制理念统领监狱各项工作》载《中国监狱》。2006年第5期
3. 新疆监狱学会，《新疆监狱系统改造危安犯交流》专辑载《监狱研究》。2005年第12期。
4. 李卫国、孙新民《新时期“危安犯”监管工作现状及深化途径探析》载《监狱研究》。2006年第5期。

China Adds Life Without Parole to Anti-Corruption Arsenal

The National People's Congress passes the ninth amendment to the Criminal Law in August. Credit: Chinanews.com

Just before passing the ninth amendment to the Criminal Law late last month, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress inserted a new provision. Unlike many other new provisions, including those regarding defense lawyers and capital punishment, “cults,” and protestors, this provision was not subject to public consultation. In China’s non-democratic political system, public consultation is one of the few chances for citizens to provide input into the legislative and policymaking processes. It is intended, at least in part, to reinforce popular support for the outcome.

This last-minute provision altered Article 383, which covers the offenses of corruption and taking bribes. Effective November 1, the provision authorizes courts, in certain cases, to add a condition at the time of sentencing to require an individual to spend life in prison without possibility of sentence reduction or parole. The condition may only be applied in corruption cases where the defendant received a suspended death sentence and had that sentence commuted to life imprisonment after the two-year period of reprieve. If such a condition is imposed, the convicted individual will not be eligible for clemency that is ordinarily available under law—meaning that he or she will truly be required to spend the rest of his or her life in prison.

Paving the Way to Abolition

Chinese media has emphasized the significance of this provision as part of the sweeping anti-corruption campaign that has become a signature policy of Xi Jinping. Legal experts and commentators have widely praised the move for sending a strong signal that corruption will continue to be punished severely.

Others have noted that the introduction of life without possibility of release may have wider implications for abolishing the death penalty in China. Public attitudes toward the death penalty are complex and context-dependent, but continued popular support for capital punishment is one factor underlying the cautious and gradual approach that China’s leaders have adopted in reducing its use. Longstanding anger over rampant corruption has helped fuel public support and contributed to anxiety over efforts to strip the death penalty from many economic and non-violent offenses.

Part of this anxiety is rooted in the belief that the death penalty is the only punishment severe enough to deter the most serious crimes. However, in recent years, policies aimed at gradual abolition have led to fewer and fewer death sentences in corruption cases, making suspended death sentences the de facto maximum penalty. Through commutation and sentence reduction, individuals given suspended death sentences can potentially leave prison after serving terms not much longer than the maximum sentence of fixed-term imprisonment, or about 18 years. Some members of the public also worry that corrupt officials might be able to use connections or bribes to buy prison stays that are even shorter.

Given these factors, the introduction of life without parole in serious corruption cases has the potential to mitigate some of the public doubts about lenient punishment for corrupt officials. In so doing, it could also clear the way for China to eventually eliminate the death penalty for corruption. Advocates of death penalty reform anticipate that imprisoning corrupt officials for the rest of their lives would satisfy the public’s expectation of severe punishment. They also believe that in the future life without parole could be extended to other types of crime—including violent offenses.

Following a reform model often seen in China, legal reformers thus appear to have taken advantage of the current anti-corruption environment to experiment with a new kind of punishment and assess the prospects for further refinement and expansion based on practical experience.

A number of issues remain to be addressed. Zhuang Deshui, an anti-corruption expert at Peking University, points out that in order for the new measure to have its desired deterrent effect, courts must “dare” to use it. To this end, Professor Zhao Bingzhi of Beijing Normal University Law School notes that it is necessary for the Supreme People’s Court to issue a judicial interpretation setting clear guidelines for when to apply the new condition. How fairly the condition is applied will play an important role in whether the public can accept life without parole as a substitute for the death penalty.

Choosing Retribution over Rehabilitation

By choosing to deprive certain prisoners of any possibility for early release, China is giving more weight to the retributive and deterrent functions of criminal punishment than to its longstanding emphasis on rehabilitation and reform. If things continue to develop in this direction, what impact might this have on China’s criminal justice system?

Other than the United States, where in the 1980s an abrupt departure from reformative justice helped make life without possibility of commutation or parole a common sentence, very few other jurisdictions impose such categorical penalties. Elsewhere, in fact, it is more common to make possible some form of conditional release after ensuring that an individual has been imprisoned long enough to reflect the seriousness of his or her offense. This is in keeping with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. The rules state that the protection of society through imprisonment, and other deprivations of liberty, “can be achieved only if the period of imprisonment is used to ensure, so far as possible, the reintegration of such persons into society upon release so that they can lead a law-abiding and self-supporting life.”

In an article published just last year, Professor Zhao Bingzhi criticized life imprisonment without the possibility of sentence reduction or parole as inhumane and a violation of human dignity comparable to the death penalty itself. In a forum on death penalty reform in 2008, Zhao and other Chinese legal experts presented arguments on why life without parole was unreasonable and ill suited to China’s justice system. Now, however, these same experts appear to be embracing more stringent penalties in the interest of making it possible to do more to reduce the death penalty. Life without the possibility of release for corrupt officials may be popular with the public, but the American experience ought to serve as a warning to China that failure to strike the right balance between punishment and reform can lead to many new and serious challenges to human rights.